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In my paper I will try to give you some overview of modern Confucianism during last one hundred years.

As I have read recently in an online newspaper, in the middle of June this year staff in the library of the Chinese Academy of Sciences were assembling huge display boards to commemorate one of this year’s significant moments: the 90th birthday of the Chinese Communist party, China’s only governing party for the last 60 years. Once such displays carried images of workers, peasants and soldiers, united under the party’s red banner, you probably remember. Today, these banners speak of science, technology and modernity.

The party’s birthday is being celebrated at what seems a moment of triumph in all these categories: China has never been richer or more engaged in the world; investment in science and technology is sky high; the economy is booming while others splutter. Beijing is crowded with skyscrapers and grandiose cultural monuments, built to show that China’s capital wants to be a world-class city. It seems like a happy event.

There is another significant anniversary this year of a milestone on the way to this moment of economic power: the centenary of the 1911 revolution, which brought an end to the Qing dynasty and with it some 2,000 years of imperial tradition. Unlike the birthday of the party, however, it is being oddly underplayed in mainland China.

Surely the overthrow of what the party still calls the “semi-feudal system” that had delivered a weakened China into the hands of foreign powers is a moment any revolutionary party would celebrate. So why the official reticence?

One easy answer is that the revolution preceded the appearance of the Communist party by a full decade. Since the party’s preferred historical narrative casts it as the only begetter of China’s liberation and subsequent rise, this awkward complication is hard to overlook. The events of 1911 are simply too messy to lend themselves to the heroic narrative of leadership that underpins revolutionary history. There was no masterplan, no clear leader, no single ideology – just a ferment of ideas, as intellectuals, officials and revolutionaries devoured new theories in science, technology, history and politics, arguing about China’s decline. Some blamed the Manchu emperors, others the suffocating dominance of a backward-looking Confucianism, with its stress on social hierarchy that had ended in stagnation. A republic with representative democracy was a widely shared aspiration.

A century later the Communist party’s rule has begun to resemble the system that 1911’s accidental revolutionaries overthrew: a large and privileged bureaucracy, hereditary privileges in the ruling elite, a mass of toiling workers and farmers – and, finally, the embrace of Confucius, the man the revolutionaries rejected 100 years ago, as someone with a lot to say about hierarchical government. In January this year a 9.5-meter statue of the sage was erected outside the National Museum in Tiananmen Square, hitherto the preserve of revolutionary heroes. But in April, without explanation, the statue disappeared – no idea where.

Confucian influence, however, remains. The official doctrine today is not class struggle but

harmony. In China's parks and city squares ever larger numbers of people are coming together to sing the stirring songs of the Maoist era – the latest wave of nostalgic cultural revolution kitsch to be reinvented as a social trend. But in the party schools, theorists labour to refashion the Marxist theoretical canon to a task as painful and difficult – and finally pointless – as the legendary Confucian eight-legged essay, the gold standard examination that imperial bureaucrats had to pass.

Following the downfall of the Qing dynasty in the Revolution of 1911, the republican period (1912–1949) of China witnessed the debates about the value of Confucianism in modern times. While Kang Youwei 康有為 (1858–1927) called for the re-establishment of Confucianism as the state cult, advocates of the anti-Confucian May Fourth movement, such as Chen Duxiu 陳獨秀 (1879–1942), blamed the tradition for all of China's problems. The latter point of view was captured in the radical slogan “Down with the Confucian shop!” (*dadao kongjia dian* 打倒孔家店).

As you surely know, Kang Youwei was major thinker and reformer of the late Qing dynasty and early republican period. He was educated through the Confucian tradition, especially that of the Cheng-Zhu School (程朱理學, 程朱學派 = school of the Cheng brothers, i.e. Cheng Yi 程頤 and Cheng Hao 程顥, and Zhu Xi 朱熹), one of two major schools of the Neoconfucian movement, known in Chinese as *lixue* 理學 (School of Principle or learning of Principle). He was also engaged in the *shixue* 實學, or practical learning, but he devoted more time to Buddhism and the Lu-Wang School of heart-mind in his later studies. Lu-Wang School (陸王心學, 陸王學派 = school of Lu Jiuyuan 陸九淵 and Wang Yangming 王陽明) was the other major school of the Neoconfucian movement, known in Chinese as *xinxue* 心學 (School of heart-mind). Kang Youwei was also influenced by Western science and began to see the need for societal reform. Though he based his ideas of reform on Western models, he sought to justify them in Chinese tradition. He regarded Confucianism not as a doctrine to be dropped in the face of modernization, but as a vehicle for the transformation of China. Kang Youwei was the major reformer in the Hundred Days of Reform in 1898. He proposed a series of reforms on education, the military, and economic and government structure. However, the conservative forces in government led by empress dowager Cixi considered these actions to be a threat. With the arrests of the reformers, the reform efforts came to an end in September 1898; Kang Youwei barely escaped to Hong Kong. He then lived in exile for fifteen years, during which time he formulated his utopian ideas into the *Datong shu* 大同書, or Book of Great Unity. After the downfall of the Manchu court in 1911, he found himself more and more as a remnant of a past era. Yet he still struggled to reintroduce Confucianism as the national religion in a time that witnessed the rejection of Confucianism as both institution and ideology. He became the president of the Confucian Association in 1912, elevating Confucius not only as a reformer, but also as a religious leader. Kang Youwei reinterpreted Confucianism as both a philosophy of reform and a religion.

Following the fall of Manchu dynasty, Chinese society has witnessed several periods of the rejection of Confucianism. First of them was the May Fourth movement, an intellectual revolution in modern China named after the May Fourth incident of 1919 and following protests of the part of Chinese intellectuals and students against their government for its continued position of weakness in dealing with foreign powers. The May Fourth movement in a broad sense is also known as the New Culture Movement that embraced Western ideas. Its time span is problematic—some historians limit it politically between 1917 and 1921, other trace it back to 1915, when Chen Duxiu launched the New Youth magazine (新青年/*La*

Jeunesse), and extends it to 1927. Slogans of science and democracy were the common ground of the movement as was a new rise in the pitch of nationalism. In general, the movement rejected traditional Chinese culture, seeing it as an obstacle to modernization. Confucianism was denounced as the vestige of the past and the feudal ethical code had to be abandoned for China to emerge with new morals and a constitutional government. Under Hu Shi's 胡適 (1891–1962) slogan “down with the Confucian shop,” the movement represents a new force against Kang Youwei's attempt to re-establish Confucianism as state religion.

The second major period of anti-Confucianism came with the Cultural Revolution, a period of sociopolitical turmoil from 1966 to 1976 directed by Mao Zedong and carried out by Lin Biao and Jiang Qing and her followers. The purpose of the Cultural Revolution, or *Wenhua dageming* 文化大革命, was to disseminate Mao's ideology and eradicate traditional Chinese civilization. Since Confucianism was the principal target of the “four olds” 四舊 (old ideas, old culture, old customs, and old habits), Confucian classics were burned, the tomb and statue of Confucius were destroyed, and the Confucian temple at Qufu 曲阜 was demolished by the Red Guards, the young adorers of Mao. The belief in the importance of the family, which is at the core of the Confucian belief system, was replaced by the concept of class struggle. In a sense, the cult of Mao replaced Confucianism as the state religion.

Another wave of anti-Confucianism was seen during the last stage of the revolution between 1973 and 1974. This time it was fused with a campaign to criticize Lin Biao as well as a political struggle against Premier Zhou Enlai. After Mao had chosen Lin Biao as his successor, Lin allegedly planned to assassinate Mao but was killed in a mysterious airplane crash in 1971. Mao publicly accused Lin of being a supporter of Confucius. A number of articles soon appeared that condemned Confucius, denouncing him as a defender of the ancient slavery system and calling his school a reactionary school. The Chief of the Science and Education Department urged all schools to participate in the criticism of Confucius. The event is known as *Pi Lin pi Kong yundong* 批林批孔運動, or The Criticize Lin (Biao), Criticize Confucius Campaign. Jiang Qing, Mao's third wife, seized the chance to attack Premier Zhou Enlai and other veteran cadres who opposed her in an attempt to usurp power. Zhou Enlai was likened to the Duke of Zhou in the Confucian tradition, yet Mao spoke in dispraise of her ambition, and the movement ceased.

As an anti-Confucianism movement, the Cultural Revolution was a continuance of the May Fourth Movement half a century earlier, but its scale was much larger and many intellectuals suffered persecution.

In the 1920s the New Confucianism (新儒家 or 新儒學), a modern inheritance of Neo-Confucianism, has emerged as a product of interaction between the Chinese tradition and Western learning. The school aims to carry on the Neo-Confucian *daotong* 道統 or tradition of the Way and to modernize Chinese culture in a global context. The movement began in 1921 with the publication of Liang Shuming's 梁漱溟 (1893–1988) *Dong-Xi wenhua ji qi zhexue* 東西文化及其哲學 or *Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies*, in which the author compares and contrasts Chinese culture with Indian and Western civilizations, concluding that only Confucianism leads to the truth of life. This was followed by a series of writings by Xiong Shili 熊十力 (1885–1968) who suggests that the Confucian value must be re-established as the *ti* 體 or substance before adopting Western culture as its *yong* 用, function. Bearing the *ti/yong* binarism in mind, Xiong Shili's disciples and followers developed different systems in the 1930s and 1940s. The most outstanding ones were the *xin lixue* 新理學, or new learning of Principle, of Feng Youlan (Fung Yulan) 馮友蘭 (1895–1990) and the *xin xin xue* 新心學, or new learning of the heart-mind, of He Lin 賀麟 (1902–1992).

While Feng Youlan utilized new realism to interpret the Cheng-Zhu *lixue* (School of Principle or learning of Principle), He Lin explicated the Lu-Wang *xinxue* (School of Heart-Mind) in the light of Neo-Hegelianism. He advocated the use of Western philosophy to elaborate Neo-Confucianism and the absorption of Christian essence to enrich the Confucian code. He asserted that New Confucianism would become the mainstream trend of thought in modern China. Ironically, the New Confucian movement retreated to Taiwan and Hong Kong in 1949 when communism took over the mainland. Both He Lin and Feng Youlan, being in China, were forced to accept Marxism.

The 1950s and 1960s witnessed the rise of a group of New Confucians in Hong Kong and Taiwan. Most of them, including Fang Dongmei (Thomé H. [= Hsün] Fang) 方東美 (1899–1977), Tang Junyi (T'ang Chüni, T'ang Kiunyi, T'ang Tsiunyi, Tang Chuni) 唐君毅 (1909–1978), and Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 (1909–1995), were well-trained in both traditional Chinese culture and modern Western philosophy, and thus were good at Chinese-Western comparison. The 1958 “Wei Zhongguo wenhua jinggao shijie renshi xuanyan” 為中國文化敬告世界人士宣言 or “A Manifesto for a Re-appraisal of Sinology and Reconstruction of Chinese Culture,” drafted by Tang Junyi and co-authored by Mou Zongsan, Zhang Junmai (Carsun Chang, Chang Chun-mai) 張君勱 (1886–1969), and Xu Fuguan 徐復觀 (1902/1903–1982), marked the high tide of the movement. Later works such as Mou Zongsan’s *Xinti yu xingti* 心體與性體 or Heart-Mind and Nature continued to urge a reconstruction of the Confucian moral subjectivity. The marginal position of these self-exiled Confucians often yielded a passion of diaspora and an obsession of China in their discourses.

The third wave of New Confucianism appeared in the 1980s with the second-generation Hong Kong, Taiwan, and overseas Chinese Confucians coming to maturity. Confucian scholars such as Jin Yaoji (Ambrose Yeo-Chi King) 金耀基 (b. 1935), Liu Shuxian 劉述先 (b. 1934/7), and Du Weiming (Tu Weiming, Tu Wei-Ming) 杜維明 (b. 1940), and intellectual historian Yu Yingshi 余英時 (b. 1930) reflect on the spiritual crisis of modern life. They point out that modernization is not simply Westernization, suggesting a critical inheritance and creative transformation of the Confucian tradition to respond to the challenge of Western culture. Other issues like the religious dimension of Confucianism are also explored.

During the 1980s, New Confucianism revived in post-Mao mainland China. It is deeply influenced by, but not identical with, the Neo-Confucianism of the Song and Ming dynasties. It is a neo-conservative movement of various Chinese traditions and has been regarded to contain religious overtones; it advocates for certain Confucianist elements of society—such social, ecological, and political harmony—to be applied in a contemporary context in synthesis with Western philosophies such as rationalism and humanism. Its philosophies have emerged as a focal point of discussion between Confucian scholars in mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States.

In 2006, China’s Communist Party formally endorsed a political doctrine laid out by President Hu Jintao 胡錦濤 that calls for the creation of a “harmonious society” (*hexie shehui* 和諧社會), a move that further signalled a shift in the party’s focus from promoting all-out economic growth to solving worsening social tensions. First proposed by the Chinese government during the 2005 National People’s Congress, the idea changes China’s focus from economic growth to overall societal balance and harmony. The idea has been described as resembling characteristics of New Confucianism in some aspects.

Another example of use a classical Chinese concept to legitimize the Chinese Communist Party vision for the future of China is the concept of a Xiaokang society (*xiaokang shehui* 小康社會). Xiaokang is a Confucian term describing a society of modest means, or a society

composed of a functional middle-class. Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping 鄧小平 used the term of Xiaokang society in 1979 as the eventual goal of Chinese modernization. The current usage of the term also invokes ancient Chinese thought in support of modern Chinese Marxism. In an ancient Chinese writing a Xiaokang society was the predecessor to the great unity (*da tong* 大同). There is a rough correspondence between this progression and the progression in Chinese Marxism between a market socialist society and world communism.

The concept of a Xiaokang society is the first time in which the Communist Party of China has used a classical Chinese concept to legitimize its vision for the future of China. Its recent use has been associated with Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao as a goal for mainland China to reach by the year 2020. "Xiaokang" is also a name for a semi-monthly magazine that is affiliated to the *Qiushi Magazine* 求是杂志, the party-run magazine in Beijing. Started in 2004, it mainly focuses on the political and economic development in China. Referred to itself as "Insight China", "Xiaokang" defines itself as magazines that voices public opinions and discuss the current affairs regarding the Chinese Politics and social cultures.

The mysterious removal of a statue of Confucius opposite Beijing's Tiananmen Square in April sparked an online flurry of speculation by Chinese looking for an explanation.

The statue of the 2,500-year-old sage was unveiled just three months ago in the Communist government's most visible endorsement yet of a cultural icon it had once reviled. In April it was missing from the pavement on the north side of the recently reopened National Museum of China, with no notice as to where or why it had gone.

Online forums were abuzz with speculation as to its fate. The news portal sina.com quoted a museum staffer saying it had been moved inside to a new sculpture garden. The staffer, who wasn't identified by name, said the statue had been displayed outdoors while the garden was being completed.

The 9.5-meter bronze sculpture of a robed Confucius had sat just northeast of Tiananmen Square roughly facing a massive portrait of Mao Zedong, founder of China's Communist regime, hanging from famed Tiananmen Gate at the entrance to the Forbidden City.

Confucius was at the centre of Chinese civilization for nearly two millennia but was widely denigrated by Mao, who railed constantly against traditional culture and what he called "feudal thinking."

Thirty-five years after Mao's death, the statue's appearance was seen as proof of Confucius' rehabilitation as an underlying ideology for a society that has largely discarded communist ideology, even as it retains the one-party Leninist political system.

Already in recent years, Confucius has featured in new books and training courses, as well as in a poorly received state-funded biopic last year starring famed Hong Kong actor Chow Yun-Fat in the title role.

While the statue's new location could not be verified, Internet users speculated as to whether its removal had been planned all along, or had been prompted by political pressure. The website maoflag.net favoured by hard-core Maoists critical of China's pro-market leadership, heralded the statue's removal as a sign of the government giving way to popular sentiment against building up ideological rivals to the foreign leader.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION.